The Regulation of Paid Care Workers’ Wages and Conditions  in the Non-Profit Sector:  A Toronto Case Study by Charlesworth, Sara
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Regulation of Paid Care Workers’ Wages and Conditions in the Non-Profit Sector: A
Toronto Case Study"
 
Sara Charlesworth
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 65, n° 3, 2010, p. 380-399.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/044888ar
DOI: 10.7202/044888ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 09:50
The Regulation of Paid Care 
Workers’ Wages and Conditions  
in the Non-Profit Sector:  
A Toronto Case Study
Sara Charlesworth
The paper explores the distinctive regulatory space in which care workers’ wages 
and conditions are determined. it draws on a case study of the non-profit sector 
of Toronto illustrated by the experience of four social services agencies located 
there. in doing so it examines the intersection between industrial regulation and 
practice, and other regulatory constraints or mechanisms identified by Lessig 
(1988). in community services these mechanisms include funding models, the 
gendered social norms that presume and underpin the valuation of paid care 
work and the organization of care work in diverse care settings. it is the mix of 
these regulatory forces and the specific contexts within which they interact that 
effect particular wage and non-wage outcomes for care work.
KeyWorDs: paid care work, funding models, gender, regulation, wages and non-
wage benefits
Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to understandings of the broader regulatory context 
in which remuneration for care work is negotiated and determined by drawing 
on a case study of the non-profit (NP) social services sector in Toronto. In doing 
so it moves beyond the formal legal regulation of the employment relationship to 
include other crucial forces identified by Lessig (1998) including: markets; social 
norms; and architecture or the spatial and built environment. The direct and indirect 
ways these factors interact affect particular outcomes in particular contexts (Lessig, 
1998: 666). This institutionalist approach underpins much of the new regulation 
scholarship recognizing that “social processes are influenced by a wide range of 
regulatory influences” (Frazer, 2006: 224). The paper focuses on the remuneration 
of workers who provide paid care in NP community services agencies in Toronto. It 
draws both on the literature and the experience of four different agencies to map the 
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intersections between different forms of regulation and to identify the effects they 
produce in practice (Arup, 2006: 719). In this sense the NP sector in Toronto provides 
a specific formative context in which these intersections and interactions shape the 
remuneration of paid care workers. 
The NP sector in Toronto, of course, sits within both a global and national context. 
Baines points to three forces that have provided the backdrop to the restructured social 
services sector since the 1970s. These include deinstitutionalization, the discourse of 
client and human rights and the market-oriented restructuring of the welfare state 
(2006). The Canadian experience of neoliberal restructuring, particularly in the NP 
sector, is broadly representative of the experience in other developed economies 
with the spread of privatization, decentralization and individualized responses to 
public needs common to all (Evans, Richmond and Shields, 2005). The New Public 
Management (NPM) philosophy that is reflected in these trends is associated with 
demands for efficiency, accountability and lean production and in the social services 
has been directed at reducing service costs by shifting service delivery from the public 
to the for-profit (FP) and NP sectors (Baines, 2004a). The neoliberal model of market-
based regulation has introduced competitive practices or quasi markets, moving 
many NP organizations away from their community-orientated focus and towards 
a business model, with “negative consequences for non-profit mission, culture and 
labour-management practices” (Evans, Richmond and Shields, 2005: 73). In Canada 
the provincial context of regulation is crucial. This is reflected not only in the legal 
regulation of work in community services but also in the government funding of 
this work (Meinhard and Foster, 1998). For example, in response to the government 
deficit in 1995/96 the Ontario government decreased social assistance by 22%, cut 
transfer payments to municipalities and reduced payments to social services agencies 
by 7.5% (Clutterbuck and Howarth, 2007: 37). 
The next two sections describe the fieldwork on which the paper draws and provide 
an overview of the main employment conditions of workers in Toronto NP community 
services agencies, illustrated by the experience of four social services agencies. The 
following section then turns to an analysis of four regulatory mechanisms that 
contribute to different outcomes for workers in the sector including: industrial 
regulation; funding markets for community services; the structuring effect of social 
norms that position paid care work as women’s work; and the gendered architecture 
of care work that underpins the organization of that work.
The Toronto Case study 
This paper draws on data gathered in Toronto in April 2009 as part of a study exploring 
the main features and consequences for employees of the practical operation of 
industrial relations in the Australian and Canadian community services sector. In-
depth interviews were undertaken with 22 people to gain a range of perspectives on 
the challenges facing the sector in Toronto and the broader provincial and national 
contexts in which they operate. In particular, the focus in the interviews was on 
the ways in which these challenges have shaped agency employment practices and 
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employee conditions. To better understand the practical impact on wages and non-
wage benefits, interviews were undertaken with the executive directors of three large 
and one smaller NP agencies (including in one case also with relevant managers and 
in another case a brief discussion with one of the agency workers). Two of these 
agencies, Neighbourhood Agency A and Neighbourhood Agency B, provide a range of 
services to people at several locations within particular neighbourhoods including day 
programmes, home care, employment and settlement services and other services for 
vulnerable groups. Neighbourhood Agency A employs around 100 workers of whom 
a large proportion work on a part-time basis. Neighbourhood Agency B employs 
over 200 workers of whom more than half work part-time. Family Agency provides a 
range of ethno-specific services across broader Toronto to families and children across 
a range of worksites, and employs more than 100 workers of whom approximately a 
quarter work part-time. Emergency Agency provides trauma counselling and support 
across Toronto. It has only one location and employs 18 full-time social workers, also 
using a pool of 30 paid relief social workers. Typical of the sector as a whole, the vast 
majority of employees in the four agencies were female. 
Interviews were also undertaken with representatives from the two main unions 
in the sector, the municipal labour council and the local social planning and research 
council. No attempt was made to interview frontline workers, although the interviews 
and analysis were informed by insights from research conducted by Baines (2006), 
Aronson, Denton and Zeytinoglu (2004) and CSPCT (2006). Interviews were also 
undertaken with senior staff from the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the Pay 
Equity Commission, two relevant Ontario government departments, two freelance 
researcher/advocates, and five Canadian academics with active research projects in 
the sector. Detailed written notes were taken during the interviews, dictated shortly 
afterwards and transcribed. These interview records were later coded around the main 
factors and contexts identified by informants. The study also involved the collection 
and review of agency documents, collective agreements and other relevant reports as 
well as Statistics Canada data. 
employees, Wages and employment Conditions in Toronto 
nP Community services 
In 2008 there were 53,610 employees in what is called the “social assistance subsec-
tor” in Toronto (City of Toronto, 2008),1 an increase of more than 11% over the last 
decade. The overwhelming majority of employees are female (83%) and in some 
areas of Ontario up to a third of agencies have employees who identify as people of 
colour (Clutterbuck and Howarth, 2007: 19). City of Toronto data for 2006 indicate 
almost half of employees in the sector work in small establishments of less than 20 
employees and that 27% of employees in the social assistance sector are unionized. 
Part-time employment makes up 24% of all employment in the sector and is unequal-
ly distributed between men and women – 25% of female employees work part-time 
compared with 17% of male employees. In agencies in Toronto 24% of employees 
were employed on a temporary basis (City of Toronto, 2008). The incidence of both 
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temporary and part-time work is higher in smaller agencies and among employees in 
frontline or administrative positions (Clutterbuck and Howarth, 2007: 48, 50). 
Data on wage rates collected at the four agencies where the executive director (ED) 
was interviewed suggest there is considerable variation between agencies in the sector 
and between full-time and part-time employees within the same agency (see Table 1). 
The three unionized agencies, Neighbourhood Agencies A and B and Family Agency, pay 
significantly higher wages for social work or equivalent qualified employees than does 
the non-unionized Emergency Agency. Between the three unionized agencies there are 
also differences. Under the terms of its collective agreement, Family Agency not only 
pays higher rates for social work qualified employees and to others in less qualified 
frontline positions but also pays on the basis of incremental salary scales that are 
adjusted annually until the highest increment is reached. While part-time employees in 
Neighbourhood Agencies A and B have different job designations to full-time employees, 
on an annualized basis they earn far less than those in comparable full-time positions 
in these agencies and well under the 2008 median hourly wage in the Toronto social 
assistance sector of $17.90 (City of Toronto, 2008). Relief social workers at Emergency 
Agency are paid a flat $15 per hour, far less than the hourly wage paid to full-time social 
workers. Only Family Agency pays its part-time employees prorated wages. 
TABLE 1
Wage Rates in Four Social Services Agencies
Agency
neighbourhood 
agency a1 
neighbourhood 
agency B2
family agency 3
emergency 
agency 4
Positions
•	Home	support	
worker/personal 
support worker
•	Employment	
counsellor
•	Program	
assistant
•	Women	abuse	
program worker
•	Child	and	
youth worker 
(min 3 months 
experience/ 
training)
•	Social	worker	
(BsW)
•	Social	worker	
(qualified)
FT Wage Rates 
per annum
•	$34,572	
•	$42,740
•	$31,077
•	$43,860
•	$43,295	-	
$58,813
•	$47,575	- 
$63,834
•	$36,500	
Designation of PT 
status
those employed 
for less than 17.5 
hours per week
those employed 
for less than 24 
hours per week. 
although home 
support workers 
can be asked to 
work up to 40 
hours per week
those working  
less than 35  
hours
Designated PT 
positions
•	Home	care	
worker
•	Program	
support worker
•	Home	help	
worker
•	Home	support	
workers
•	Relief	social	
worker 
Wage Rates 
(PT) per hour
not specified 
in ca
•	$12.13
•	$13.53
•	$15.27
pro rata 
•	$15.00	
notes: 1 rates as of January 2008; 2 rates as of april 2009; 3 rates as of april 2008; 4 rates as of april 2009.
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A recent study highlights differences in access to basic conditions such as vacation 
pay and sick pay for part-time workers in unionized workplaces (CSPCT, 2006: 8), 
a difference that is reflected in the collective agreements in the three unionized 
agencies interviewed. Neighbourhood Agency A’s collective agreement excludes part-
time employees from paid vacation leave, but according to the ED, they are paid 
4% of their salary in lieu of this leave. In the collective agreement they are expressly 
excluded from sick leave as well as various other forms of leave such as bereavement, 
pregnancy and parental leave. At Neighbourhood Agency B, employees designated 
as part-time receive up to 5% pay in lieu of vacation leave. At Family Agency, all 
part-time employees are entitled to vacation and sick leave on a prorated basis. At 
Emergency Agency relief social work staff are not entitled to any separate sick or 
vacation pay or payment in lieu of these benefits.
While it is difficult to obtain data on access to non-wage benefits in community 
services agencies in Toronto, a review of collective agreements indicates such access 
is highly variable (CSPCT, 2006: 28-29). It is clear that access to such benefits within 
agencies is more limited for part-time and temporary employees, employees in smaller 
agencies and employees in non-unionized workplaces (McMullen and Schellenberg, 
2003: 37). Certain groups of workers, such as home care workers, are also much less 
likely to get other conditions such as paid sick leave, annual leave or employer provided 
Agency
neighbourhood 
agency a 
neighbourhood 
agency B
family agency
emergency  
agency
Benefits for FT employees
•	100%	extended	health	care	plan	premiums
•	 Life	insurance	
•	Vision	care	plan
•	Dental	care	plan
•	Employer	contribution	of	3-4%	to	RRSP
•	100%	extended	health	care	plan	premiums
•	 Life	insurance	
•	Dental	care	plan
•	Employer	contribution	of	6-8%	to	RRSP
•	100%	pension	plan	and	life	insurance	
premiums 
•	100%	extended	care	premiums
•	100%	long	term	disability	premiums
•	Dental	plan
•	Vision	care	plan	
•	 Extras	health	benefit	plan	includes	some:
- medical and dental cover
- eye care cover
- prescription cover
Benefits for PT employees
•	PT	employees	paid	5%	in	lieu	of	non-wage	
benefits
•	PT	employees	paid	6-8%	in	lieu	of	non-wage	
benefits
•	Home	support	workers	no	non-wage	benefits	or	
payment in lieu
•	After	1	year’s	service	PT	and	home	support	workers	
eligible	for	employer	contribution	of	2%	to	RRSP
•	Same	benefits	pro-rata
•	No	PT	employees
•	Relief	employees	receive	no	non-wage	benefits	or	
payment in lieu
TABLE 2
Non-Wage Benefits in Four Social Services Agencies
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benefits (HCSSC, 2003a). Even in collective agreements there is a wide variation among 
unionized agencies in the non-wage benefits provided (CSPCT, 2006). 
These differences were reflected in the collective agreements in the three unionized 
agencies as highlighted in Table 2. While there is some variation, full-time employees 
in the unionized agencies have access to a similar range of benefits, while in the non-
unionized Emergency Agency full-time employees have a smaller range of benefits and 
at a lower level with no employer contribution to any retirement savings plan (RRSP). 
Once again what is striking is the exclusion of part-time employees in Neighbourhood 
Agencies A and B from most non-wage benefits. Although most part-time employees 
at both agencies receive some payment in lieu of these benefits, home support workers 
at Neighbourhood Agency B are specifically excluded from any benefits other than a 
2% employer RRSP contribution after one year’s service. In contrast at Family Agency 
part-time employees receive these benefits on a prorata basis. 
The Impact of Different Regulatory Forces 
So what underpins the extent of this variation in care workers pay and conditions, 
not only between unionized and non-unionized agencies but also between unionized 
agencies providing a similar range of services? The next part of the paper turns to 
the regulatory space in which the NP community service sector in Toronto operates, 
identifying four main regulatory forces that that contribute to different outcomes for 
workers in the sector. 
industrial regulation
In Canada, provinces hold the primary authority to regulate industrial relations (Thomp-
son and Taras, 2004). As Lessig points out, legal regulation like all forms of regulation 
has both a direct and indirect aspect (1998: 666). For example both the Employment 
Standards Act 2000 (ESA) and collective agreements negotiated between unions and 
agencies directly regulate the wages and conditions by setting down not only care 
workers’ wages and conditions, but to whom they are paid and on what basis. Less 
directly the implementation of other industrial regulation such as that governing the 
processes of unionization and collective bargaining also shapes which agencies are 
likely to be unionized and which employees are likely to be covered or excluded under 
collective agreements.
The Canadian industrial model is one where collective representation is tied to a single 
employer at a single workplace (Thompson and Taras, 2004). Collective bargaining 
laws require that employees take the initiative to bring collective bargaining into their 
workplaces and also that the majority of employees in a designated bargaining unit 
support a particular union (Fudge and Vosko, 2001: 342).
While workers employed in unionized and non-unionized workplaces may carry 
out similar work under similar conditions, their wages, non-wage benefits and 
conditions of work are very different as we see in the far higher level of remuneration 
paid to social work qualified employees in Family Agency in contrast to those in 
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Emergency Agency. However, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 above there are also 
differences between unionized workplaces and differences between full-time and 
part-time workers within unionized workplaces in terms of wages, non-wage benefits 
and conditions of work. The collective bargaining regime in Canada works in effect 
to exclude non-standard workers and those in smaller workplaces (Fudge and Vosko, 
2001: 342). 
Interviews with union representatives suggest such differences within unionized 
workplaces may reflect the priorities of individual union locals and some antipathy 
of full-time members to the inclusion of part-time workers in the bargaining unit. 
Ambivalence about unions proactively pursing the interests of part-time and temporary 
workers was also expressed by one official from one of the major sector unions, with 
an official from the other union clearly seeing her role to educate full-time members 
about the rights of their part-time coworkers. Like the other regulatory mechanisms 
considered here, in a low-wage feminized sector characterized by the small size of 
employers and increasing non-standard employment the Canadian model of trade 
union representation and collective bargaining regime has gendered dimensions and 
gendered consequences.2 
Employees in non-unionized workplaces have to rely on the ESA, which sets out 
the minimum standards for employees in Ontario workplaces.3 That is, the terms and 
conditions of their employment are required to meet certain minimum standards in 
respect of conditions such as minimum wages, hours of work, overtime pay, paid 
vacation leave, termination and severance pay, and rights to unpaid family, pregnancy 
and parental leave.4 Nevertheless individual agencies may provide conditions that are 
over and above the ESA minima. For example, Emergency Agency provides up to 50 
recovery days per year where staff have been particularly traumatized by their work. 
According to the ED, however, staff rarely use this provision. 
There are also exemptions in the ESA in terms of notice of termination and 
severance pay for certain groups of workers such as home care workers who are 
designated as elect-to-work employees. In reality this means that they have to be 
available around the clock but never know how many hours of work they will have in 
a given week (Kushner, Baranek and Dewar, 2008: 33). Until amendments in 2009, 
home care workers were exempt from the public holidays provisions of the ESA, and 
continue to be exempt from the requirement to provide notice of termination (or 
termination pay in lieu of notice) and severance pay. Further, while the ESA provides 
for non-discrimination in employment-related benefit plans this does not provide all 
employees with access to such plans nor extend them to part-time employees who 
may be expressly excluded from these plans, illustrated by the different provisions in 
the Neighbourhood Agencies A and B agreements. 
There are other types of industrial regulation that impact on the wages and 
conditions of workers in the NP sector. These include pay equity regulation, industry-
specific regulation such as the Ontario Day Nurseries Act 1990, the mandating of 
particular services under provincial legislation and employment insurance regulation.5 
Pay equity adjustments are reflected in many current collective agreements in the NP 
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sector and pay equity regulation was raised in several of the interviews. Ontario’s pay 
equity regulation has evolved considerably since its first enactment in 1951 to the 
Pay Equity Act introduced in 1987, which has been amended several times since.6 
In essence the regulation requires that jobs in individual workplaces be evaluated 
and work mostly or traditionally done by women be compared to work mostly or 
traditionally done by men and then that workplaces put a pay equity plan in place to 
remedy any pay inequity identified. 
However because there are few if any men’s jobs to enable a comparison in 
the social services sector to be made, in 1991 a proxy comparison mechanism was 
introduced, where a similar larger workplace nearby is used as a proxy comparator, 
provided that workplace has already undertaken a pay equity job evaluation using 
the job-to-job method. According to two of the Agency EDs who were interviewed, 
agency comparisons were made with government provided-services such as hospitals. 
The Ontario government provided funds to the public sector, including the social 
services sector, to enable employers to meet pay equity adjustments (identified 
up to 3% of payroll in the first year and 1% for following years until pay equity is 
achieved). Pay equity adjustments were designed to encourage agencies in the sector 
to undertake pay equity reviews mandated by the legislation and have been factored 
into a number of collective agreements. There has been a waxing and waning of 
government commitment to fund pay equity adjustments with such funding being 
withdrawn at various points in time over the last decade.7 Feedback from the three 
unionized agencies and other informants points to the insecurity of such funding, 
where agencies have had to cover the shortfall in meeting pay equity adjustments 
which have not been provided for or have been absorbed in government funding. 
A long time sector activist also argued that the government in fact contributed to 
the pay equity problem by limiting funding for a position to a certain amount which 
meant an agency could only offer the position on a part-time basis. 
A stark example of the effects of unionization on wages in the Canadian NP sector is 
the different wages rates received by home care workers. In 2002, the lowest average 
hourly wage received by home care workers was in non-unionized NP workplaces 
($11.52). This was well below the highest hourly wage paid in unionized workplaces 
of $13.49 per hour (HCSSC, 2003a: 25). However, it is not only unionization that 
impacts on wages but also as highlighted below the way different service delivery 
models are funded. 
The Funding market as a regulatory mechanism 
In 2003, 68% of the revenue of the province’s NP community services agencies came 
from government (overwhelmingly provincial government), with 21% coming from 
earned income (such as membership fees, non-government fees for goods and ser-
vices) and only 8% from gifts and donations (Scott et al., 2006: 18, 20). The compo-
sition of revenue varies from agency to agency. In 2008 while government funding 
comprised only 53% of Family Agency’s annual revenue, it made up almost 89% of 
Neighbourhood Agency A’s revenue. The experience of the four Agencies in this study 
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suggests that the greater the reliance on government funding the less flexibility there 
is to pay wage and non wage benefits that reflect the value of the work carried out 
by care workers. Because of its historical links with major philanthropic organizations 
and relatively lesser reliance on program-specific government funding, Family Agency 
is able to provide for agency-wide wage classifications that are harmonized by dis-
cipline and for prorated benefits for part-time employees. While under the terms of 
their enterprise agreements, both Neighbourhood Agencies A and B provide for set 
wage levels for specific classifications, those classifications and the use of full-time 
employment are limited to a large extent by the funding available for specific pro-
grams. Union and labour council informants pointed to the ways in which limited 
funding not only limits the level of wage increases possible in collective agreements, 
but also whether or not an agency can afford to be unionized. With the inadequate 
government funding received by Emergency Agency and relatively low philanthropic 
or other funding, unionization is simply not an option. According to the ED: “when 
you get a grant it’s not based on any recognition of wages and decisions about wages 
follow the amount of the grant given. If you’re not unionized, the funding just has to 
be used as it can be.” 
The external funding of social services is critical to the way NP organizations 
operate. In 2003, the largest issue of concern about external funding for agencies 
was the reduction in government funding (reported by 81% of agencies surveyed), 
closely followed by the unwillingness of the funding bodies to fund core operations 
(reported by 78% of agencies) (Scott et al., 2006: 56). Funding is increasingly 
provided for shorter periods of time and is increasingly unpredictable. In 2003, 75% 
of available funding was project based compared with 17% for core funding and 
8% for seed funding (Clutterbuck and Howarth, 2007: 39). The sources of funding 
together with the quantum and structure of that funding, such as where funding is 
project-based or dependent on a competitive tendering process, impact directly on 
agencies and in turn on the wages and conditions in the sector (Scott et al., 2006).8 
Most of the revenue of these agencies is spent on wages and non wage benefits. For 
example in 2008 more than 70% of Neighbourhood Agency A’s annual revenue, both 
government and philanthropic, was spent on these two items. 
Funding constraints impact on the NP sector in a way that shapes wage and 
conditions outcomes. Firstly, NP agencies may be unwilling or unable to offer 
employees full-time hours or permanent positions relying instead on part-time 
and temporary workers and volunteers. Secondly, limited revenues and financial 
uncertainty may place a low ceiling on the wage and benefit packages NP agencies 
are able to offer (McMullen and Schellenberg, 2003: 14) A number of those 
interviewed were of the view that that the mandating of particular services, such as 
Children’s Aid, ensures better and more constant funding for such services which 
is reflected in better wage rates than in non-mandated services. However, the 
mandating of the service provided by Emergency Agency has not provided that 
service with the funding base to provide NP sector-level wage rates for its social 
workers as noted above. 
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Along with increased demands for the accountability of agencies for the funding 
they receive, there has been a growth in government-funded regulatory bodies. 
For example the central Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs), designated by 
the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to plan, integrate and fund local health 
services, including Community Care Access Centres (CCACs), is also funded by the 
Ministry which in turn coordinates the provision of in-home community-based health 
care services at the local level. Despite the stated focus on coordination, a regulatory 
link between the quality of care and the quality of paid care work is rarely made. Senior 
staff interviewed at one of the funding agencies stressed that government “stood 
outside” collective agreement negotiations. There was some sympathetic recognition 
of the struggle agencies faced especially during the period where there were no living 
wage increases included in government funding. There was also some awareness and 
concern as to how the employment of part-time and temporary workers might impact 
on skill shortages in the medium to long term. Nevertheless the view was expressed 
that it is up to the agencies to allocate their funding and organize the employment 
of paid care workers. While funding bodies may view themselves as having no role in 
determining wages and conditions, they do however require detailed documentation 
as to how any funding is expended. Neighbourhood Agency A’s ED pointed to the 
irony that funding bodies always wanted to know in detail how much the agency paid 
its staff but that “this did not lead to any increase in funding.”
While there are differences between unionized and non-unionized workplaces as 
highlighted above, it would appear that funding structures and models can effectively 
undercut the impact of unionization. Managers in both unionized and non-unionized 
agencies have reported that funding constraints meant that they could not improve 
pay equity and benefits for workers even though they wanted to do so (CSPCT, 
2006: 6). Even in unionized workplaces the trend towards project, as opposed to core, 
funding contributes to inconsistency in salaries across the sector (CSPCT, 2006) and 
within agencies as illustrated in the decrease in wages and conditions for home care 
workers employed by Neighbourhood Agency B outlined below. Where agencies do 
not have sufficient core funding or are not able to cross-subsidize from one program 
to another, as can Family Agency B because of its large revenue from philanthropic 
sources, it contributes to inconsistency between salaries within agencies. Feedback 
from the Labour Council and union officials also indicated that low levels of funding 
made it very difficult to organize in the sector, not just because of management 
reluctance but because care workers identified strongly with their clients and did not 
want to jeopardize the viability of the services their agency provided. 
In many ways the impact of funding models on care workers’ wages and conditions 
could be seen as having a gendered effect on the regulation of employment that may 
work to trump the effect of unionization.9 This can be seen clearly in the case of home 
care workers where in the traditional public provider model, where services are delivered 
mainly by publicly funded employees such as in Quebec, average hourly wage rates 
for home care workers were $14.47 per hour. In contrast under the contractual model 
employed in Ontario – where home support services are coordinated by independent 
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CCACs but contracted out to FP and NP agencies – average hourly wages for home 
care workers were $12.08 (HCSSC, 2003b: 164). The neoliberal programmatic efforts 
that have underpinned the restructuring of community services “constitute many 
women as flexible economic actors and members of the peripheral labour market” 
(Ilcan, Oliver and O’Connor, 2007: 88). The low wages and poor conditions in the NP 
community services sector together with the weak degree of regulatory protection 
afforded many care workers are directly linked to the gendered composition of the 
sector and the gendered work that is performed as highlighted below. 
Gender as a regulatory mechanism 
One of the regulatory mechanisms identified by Lessig is the constraint of social norms. 
Social norms constrain behaviour through enforcement by the community rather than 
the state (1998: 662). That is, they constrain by informal social disapproval rather 
than formal sanctions (Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, 2007: 8). An example 
of a powerful gendered norm in paid work employment is the “ideal worker” norm 
around which work is organized. An ideal worker is a worker who is able to work 
full-time (and often overtime) unencumbered by family or domestic responsibilities 
(Williams, 2000). This ideal worker norm has deep historical roots. In Canada, as in 
many other developed countries, it draws on a gender regime or contract that until 
the 1970s was centred on a male breadwinner / female caregiver model (Fudge and 
Vosko, 2001: 332). It was assumed that under this contract women would be respon-
sible for social reproduction and would have access to subsistence through the male 
wage (Ilcan, Oliver and O’Connor, 2007: 78). While the male breadwinner / female 
caregiver model no longer reflects the increased participation of women in paid em-
ployment, it remains a powerful “imaginary” underpinning the devaluation of much 
of the paid work women undertake, particularly care work. 
Gender is a key structuring regulatory force in the delivery of social services and 
in the wages and conditions of care workers. Social norms such as caring work 
as women’s work exert regulatory force through social meaning, “constituting 
understandings that set up the terms on which people understand the world” (Lessig, 
1998: 683). The normative force of gender is reflected in the overwhelming presence 
of female employees, particularly in the frontline work of caring and in the nature of 
work that is carried out. Put simply, paid care work is women’s work. Such a statement 
“refers to what women do, what we say they do and what we think they should do” 
(Armstrong, Armstrong and Scott-Dixon, 2008: 88). For many of those interviewed 
the gendered nature of the sector’s workforce, the type of work care workers perform 
and the undervaluation of that work is so pervasive as to be unremarkable. 
The undervaluing of paid caring work as work is reflected in and intertwined with 
changes in the protection offered to employees via industrial regulation. The increase 
in female labour force participation coincided with an erosion of the standard 
employment relationship and the growth of temporary and part-time work. Women 
continue to be the large majority of workers in non-standard or precarious work 
and remain disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs with little prospect of 
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career advancement (Fudge and Vosko, 2001: 347) or the protections of unions and 
the ESA.
Gender norms around care are extremely powerful even more so when they 
intersect with the market. Caring and the relationship between the care provider and 
the care recipient is thought to present rewards unique to paid care work, rewards 
that may help buffer or compensate for the stress and pressure of this work (Baines, 
2006: 131). Yet while the specific characteristics of care transcend the boundaries 
of the market, the intrinsic motivation in care work can be turned against paid care 
workers, undermining their rights as workers (Folbre, 2008: 376). 
The Gendered architecture of Paid Care Work 
The fourth regulatory constraint described by Lessig is architecture: a term he uses to 
mean “the world as I find it, understanding as I find it, much of this world is made” 
(1998: 663). Architecture is a useful way of thinking about the way in which care 
work is organized which has different gendered outcomes for different groups of 
workers. One of the ways in which the architecture of paid care work is revealed is in the 
organization of care services around seemingly distinct groups of clients. These include 
developmental disabilities services (Baines, 2006), immigrant and settlement services 
(CSPCT, 2006) and home care (Aronson and Neysmith, 2006; Aronson, Denton and 
Zeytinoglu, 2004). All these services display different characteristics not only in the 
nature of the work performed but also in the gender composition of the workforce, 
the gendered organization of work into full-time, part-time and temporary work and 
in the wages and conditions that are paid. This industrial architecture of care work 
then determines the inclusion and exclusion of groups of workers in the protection 
offered through employment standards, unionization and collective agreements. 
Agency size can be seen as a form of paid care architecture that interacts with other 
regulatory forces such as unionization to produce different outcomes for workers. This 
is exemplified in the difficulties unions face in organizing smaller agencies with flow-
on consequences for the remuneration of the workers in these agencies. Agency size 
also intersects with service viability and the greater capacity that larger agencies have 
to cross-subsidize services to provide for better wage outcomes for paid workers. 
However as set out in the next section below the positive effects of size can be 
trumped by the way in which specific services are contracted out. 
The location where care is performed is yet another form of gendered architecture 
vividly illustrated in the demarcation between care delivered in institutions and in the 
home. Apart from home-making duties undertaken by home carers, both personal 
service workers and home carers perform a similar a range of duties primarily relating 
to personal hygiene and grooming, assisting with dressing and toileting. A recent 
study shows this group of workers earns significantly different wages according to 
their employment setting and it is the setting rather than factors such as educational 
qualifications and difficulty of work that explains this difference (Lily, 2008). In 2005 
the mean hourly wage for Toronto-based personal service workers working in the 
homes of elderly clients was $12.24 compared with those working in government 
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or quasi government hospital settings who received a mean hourly wage of $16.38. 
Compounding these wage differentials is differential access to non-wage benefits, 
working conditions and opportunities for advancement. This is clearly related to 
unionization with hospital-based personal service workers generally unionized and 
those working in homes non-unionized. Thus the role of place both underscores and 
reinforces the role of industrial regulation in maintaining wage inequality (Lily, 2008). 
The wage differentials also clearly relate to the different funding models and markets 
for the provision of institutional care and care in home settings. And underpinning 
and intersecting with industrial and funding-market regulatory forces that shape 
remuneration is the normative force of gender – with the least value assigned to work 
that is closest to the unpaid caring work women do in the home. 
The “mix” of Regulatory Forces
The different regulatory forces outlined in this paper have a tangible impact on 
wage and benefit outcomes for workers in the NP community services sector. This is 
not to argue that these different regulatory constraints necessarily work in a direct 
or a cumulative way. Indeed, regulation in the labour market can be seen as “a mix 
of institutions and techniques, sometimes complementing and co-operating, har-
moniously, sometimes competing at cross purposes and even running on a collision 
course” (Arup, 2006: 719). In some contexts funding markets will trump indus-
trial regulation while in others the gendered architecture of particular care services 
means that the regulatory force of gender will be more important. The following 
illustrations suggest that the ways these different regulatory forces interact work in 
context-specific ways.
One of the many services provided by Neighbourhood Agency B is a home care 
service to elderly residents. Home care workers, who are overwhelmingly immigrant 
women, had been employed under the Agency’s collective agreement, most on 
a full-time basis. As such they benefited from the wages and non-wage benefits 
provided under the terms of this agreement. The implementation of the competitive 
procurement process employed by the provincial government and managed by the 
CCACs has meant that agencies are required to tender to provide such services. 
Because of the limited funding available, the Agency tendered in a consortium with 
other agencies. It became apparent that it was not viable for Neighbourhood Agency 
B to tender on the basis of full-time employment of its home care workers. After 
discussion with the relevant union and the home care workers, the workers opted 
to go part-time, losing hours and pay as well as most of their former non-wage 
benefits in order to maintain continuity of care for Agency clients and some Agency 
oversight of the service. Today available hours for home care are mainly allocated on 
the basis of client language and distributed across the consortium of agencies. While 
the Agency successfully argued for workers to continue to see the same clients their 
hours are not guaranteed nor are their hours necessarily rostered consecutively. The 
Agency was able to secure travel time for its home care workers but to win this they 
had to trade off their entitlements to sick leave time. 
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Neighbourhood Agency B’s experience suggests that the implementation of market 
regulation through the tendering out of home care services can undercut the protective 
effect of unionization and agency size. The home care workers remain employed by 
the Agency covered by the same union and doing the same work. However, the 
tendering out process that led to their loss of hours and benefits means they are now 
exposed more directly to the effects of the gendered architecture that places the least 
value in terms of wages on personal service work performed in clients’ homes. A 
case study of the “local reverberations” of Ontario’s managed competition in home 
care suggests that the price paid by home care workers employed by Neighbourhood 
Agency B may have been worth it, in at least maintaining employment (Aronson, 
Denton and Zeytinoglu, 2004; Aronson and Neysmith, 2006). That study, which 
tracks the outcomes of the failure of VHA, a large home care provider, to secure 
CCAC funding and the devastating impact on the displaced home care workers is a 
rich example of market ritualism that permeates government funding of care services 
(Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, 2007: 7). 
Emergency Agency provides a mandated immediate crisis response service. It 
receives some provincial and city funding, as well as some funding from philanthropic 
foundations. The Agency also relies on significant fundraising it and third parties 
undertake on behalf of the agency. Unlike many other mandated services such as 
Children’s Aid, the Agency is not unionized. In 2005 the full-time social workers who 
deliver agency’s service were paid $33,000 per annum and the relief social workers 
$12 per hour. According to the Agency ED, the main funding grants had not increased 
for 20 years and the agency carried a large deficit. Faced with cuts to the service, the 
Agency ED and Board embarked on an advocacy campaign leading up to the 2007 
provincial election. The evidently inadequate pay rates for social workers and the fact 
that there had been no increase in funding for 20 years was used to create a sense of 
urgency. The campaign led to an increase in funding and to an increase in the annual 
salary paid to social workers (to $36,500). According to the Agency ED since that time 
there have been no further funding increases and while the service delivered has not 
been cut further increases in staff wages or benefits are highly unlikely. The example 
of Emergency Agency may be an atypical one. Nevertheless, it highlights a situation 
where the regulatory force of the particular funding market in which the agency is 
located is unmodified by industrial regulation through unionization, directly driving 
the decisions made about the remuneration of staff. 
The apparent pre-eminence of the market regulatory mechanism in this case 
literally depends on the acceptance of the social workers who work in the agency 
that the intrinsic value in the work is worth the sacrifice in wages and conditions. 
One of the agency social workers said she had consciously traded the type of work 
where she had better wages and conditions in a Children’s Aid agency for what 
she found to be much more valued and rewarding work in Emergency Agency. Her 
own circumstances meant she was “able to afford” to make this financial sacrifice. 
However, she reported that other former colleagues who had expressed interest in 
the Agency’s work were not a position where they could financially manage on such 
low wages and poor benefits. Even in care work recognized as highly skilled, the 
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intrinsic motives and interests in the work can make it easier for funding bodies to 
decline any responsibility for inadequate wages and benefits such as those paid to 
Emergency Agency’s social workers. 
Conclusion
The regulation of the wages and conditions of paid care work could be described as 
“the sum total of numerous intersecting interests and value systems each modifying 
or attenuating the others” (Frazer, 2006: 226). While it is not possible to canvass 
all these interests and value systems this paper has identified four main regulatory 
forces that directly and indirectly regulate the quantum and basis of the wages and 
non-wage benefits paid to care workers. These regulatory mechanisms are industrial 
regulation, the sources and structure of the community services “market,” the regula-
tory force of gender norms and the gendered architecture of care work. 
The interaction of these regulatory forces arguably plays out in the wage and non-
wage outcomes in all community services work at the labour market, industry and 
workplace levels. That is, while the NP sector in Toronto provides a specific formative 
context in which this occurs, these regulatory forces, particularly the normative effect 
of gender, are certainly present in other provincial and national contexts. This is 
despite profound differences in the content of employment regulation, the coverage 
and role of unions, different configurations of employment and social welfare safety 
nets, and the ways in which funding care markets or care regimes are constructed. 
While the social services funding market has different features in different countries 
it is underpinned by the same global features of new public management present in 
Canada. Its regulatory force is intertwined with the normative force of gender and is 
as powerful in directly and indirectly structuring the wages and conditions of paid care 
work. Change is unlikely unless governments at all levels rethink funding and service 
models beyond those that depend on and assume the gendered undervaluation of 
paid care work.
notes
1 The City of Toronto CMA 2008 Industry Profile Data provides industry breakdowns using the 
Statistics Canada North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). This classifies the 
Social Assistance Industry (code 624) as including individual and family services, community 
food and housing, and emergency and other relief services, vocational rehabilitation services 
and child day-care services (City of Toronto, 2008). 
2 These consequences go beyond the workplace. Part-time status also limits access to other 
protection, as eligibility for, and the level of, certain social benefits is often tied to hours of 
work (Vosko and Clark, 2009).
3 In Ontario collective agreements must meet or exceed the standards in the ESA (Fairey, 2009: 
116). 
4 In the NP social services sector rights to unpaid family leave are limited to those who work in 
workplaces with over 50 employees unless otherwise stipulated in union contracts.
5 The gendered impact of changes to employment insurance regulation are detailed in Vosko 
and Clark (2009). These changes have made it harder for part-time workers to qualify for 
the reGulation of paid care Workers’ WaGes and conditions in the non-profit sector: a toronto case study 395
benefits while the hours-based formula for calculating the duration of the benefits negatively 
affects the level of benefits paid. 
6 See the Ontario Equal Pay Coalition for details of this history: <http://www.equalpaycoalition.
org/ontario.php> (accessed 20 June 2009).
7 After being frozen for some time, funding for public sector pay increases was once again 
reinstated after a 2003 Charter challenge by a number of unions although the government 
once again ceased pay equity adjustments in 2006 (Cornish, 2008). 
8 Funding structures and models also have a direct impact on workers’ conditions of work 
beyond wages and non-wage benefits. An analysis of these effects is well documented in a 
number of studies including Baines (2004a, 2004b); Aronson, Denton and Zeytinoglu (2004); 
Aronson and Smith (2009), Evans, Richmond and Shields (2005); CSPCT (2006); Ontario 
Health Coalition (2005). 
9 While a number of studies point to the persistence of unionization mark up effects on wage 
and non wage benefits (see, for a summary Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003) these effects 
in social services can be modified by the funding models used for the delivery of different 
services.
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summARy
The Regulation of Paid Care Workers’ Wages and Conditions  
in the Non-Profit Sector: A Toronto Case Study
This paper aims to contribute to understandings of the broader regulatory context in 
which remuneration for care work is negotiated and determined. It draws on a case 
study of the non-profit sector of Toronto and moves beyond an exclusive focus on the 
formal regulation of the employment relationship to include other crucial regulatory 
mechanisms in the analysis. The paper attempts to map the intersections between these 
different forms of regulation and to identify the effects they produce in practice. 
The paper identifies four main regulatory forces that shape the quantum and basis 
of the wages and non-wage benefits paid to care workers. Firstly, industrial relations 
regulation plays an important role not only through the demarcation between 
unionized and non-unionized agencies, but in demarcations between smaller and 
larger agencies, between full-time and part-time workers and between regular and 
elect-to work workers. Secondly, the sources and structure of the social services funding 
market directly limit care worker remuneration and can work to trump the impact 
of unionization. Thirdly, the regulatory force of the gendered undervaluing of paid 
care work is reflected in and intertwined with changes in the protection offered to 
employees via industrial regulation. Finally, the gendered architecture of paid care 
work, including size of agency or whether the care work is undertaken in the home 
or in an institution, contributes to different outcomes for different groups of workers 
undertaking similar work. 
The interaction of these regulatory forces plays out in the wage and non-wage outcomes 
in all social services work at the labour market, industry and workplace levels. While the 
non-profit sector in Toronto provides one specific context in which this occurs, these 
regulatory forces, particularly the normative effect of gender, are present in other 
provincial and national contexts. This is at least partly because the community services 
funding market in other developed countries is underpinned by the same features of 
new public management present in Canada.
KEyWoRDS: paid care work, funding models, gender, regulation, wages and non-wage 
benefits 
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RÉsumÉ
La régulation des salaires et autres conditions de travail des 
salariés fournissant des soins dans le secteur sans but lucratif : 
une étude de cas à Toronto
Cet article vise à améliorer la compréhension du contexte général de régulation dans 
lequel la rémunération pour le travail des fournisseurs de soins professionnels est 
négociée et déterminée. Il s’appui pour cela sur une étude de cas du secteur à but 
non lucratif de Toronto et va au-delà d’un examen portant exclusivement sur le mode 
de régulation formelle de la relation d’emploi, pour inclure d’autres mécanismes qui 
s’avèrent tout aussi cruciaux. Il cherche à cartographier les espaces communs entre ces 
différentes formes de régulation et à identifier les effets qu’ils produisent en pratique. 
L’article identifie quatre forces principales qui influent sur la base et l’ampleur des salaires 
et des avantages non salariaux du personnel de soins professionnels. Premièrement, la 
régulation des relations industrielles joue un rôle important non seulement à travers la 
traditionnelle démarcation entre agences syndiquées et agences non syndiquées, mais 
aussi entre les agences selon leur taille et entre les salariés selon leur statut d’emploi 
(à temps complet ou à temps partiel, permanents ou occasionnels). Deuxièmement, le 
financement des services sociaux limite directement la rémunération de ces salariés et 
contribue à freiner l’impact de la syndicalisation. Troisièmement, la force régulatrice de 
la sous-évaluation du travail des soignants, du fait qu’il est très majoritairement féminin, 
se reflète dans et s’entrelace avec les changements dans la protection offerte aux salariés 
via la réglementation du travail. Enfin, l’architecture sexuée du travail rémunéré dans 
ce secteur, incluant la taille des agences et selon que le travail est accompli à la maison 
ou en institution, contribue à produire des résultats différents pour différents groupes 
effectuant le même travail.
L’interaction entre ces forces régulatrices a un effet certain sur les salaires et les 
avantages non salariaux des et salariés des services sociaux que ce soit au niveau du 
marché, de l’industrie ou du lieu de travail. Bien que le secteur sans but lucratif de 
Toronto constitue un contexte spécifique pour l’observation de ce phénomène, ces 
forces régulatrices, particulièrement l’effet normatif du sexe, sont aussi présentes dans 
d’autres environnements, qu’ils soient nationaux ou provinciaux. Il en est ainsi, en 
partie du moins, parce que le marché pour le financement des services communautaires 
dans d’autres pays développés repose sur les mêmes caractéristiques du nouveau 
management public que l’on retrouve au Canada.
MoTS CLéS : travail des soignants professionnels, modèles de financement, genre, 
régulation, salaires et avantages sociaux
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Resumen
La regulación de salarios y condiciones de los cuidadores 
personales asalariados en las organizaciones sin fines 
lucrativos: Un estudio de caso en Toronto
Este documento busca contribuir a la comprensión del vasto contexto de regulación en 
que la remuneración del trabajo de cuidador es negociada y determinada. Se basa en 
un estudio de caso en el sector de organizaciones sin fines lucrativos de Toronto y va 
más allá de la regulación formal de las relaciones de empleo para incluir en el análisis 
otros mecanismos cruciales de regulación. Este documento intenta trazar un plano de 
las intersecciones existentes entre esas diferentes formas de regulación e identificar sus 
respectivos efectos en la práctica.
Se identifican cuatro principales fuerzas de regulación que modulan el monto y la base 
de los salarios y de los beneficios no salariales pagados a los trabajadores cuidadores. 
Primero, la regulación de la relaciones industriales juega un rol importante no solo a 
través la demarcación entre agencias sindicalizadas y no sindicalizadas, pero también 
en las demarcaciones entre pequeñas y grandes agencias, entre trabajadores a tiempo 
completo y a tiempo parcial y entre trabajadores regulares y trabajadores temporarios 
o de agencia. Segundo, las fuentes y estructura de los servicios sociales que financian 
directamente el mercado limitan la remuneración de los trabajadores cuidadores 
y pueden trabajar para superar el impacto de la sindicalización. Tercero, la fuerza 
reguladora de la sub-valorización sexista del salario de los trabajadores cuidadores se 
refleja y se entrelaza con los cambios en la protección ofrecida a los empleados mediante 
la regulación industrial. Finalmente, la arquitectura de tipo sexista que adopta el pago 
del trabajo de cuidador, incluyendo la talla de la agencia o el hecho que el trabajo de 
cuidar se haga a domicilio o en una institución, contribuyen a diferentes resultados para 
los diferentes grupos de trabajadores comprendidos en este tipo de trabajo.
La interacción de estas fuerzas reguladoras interviene en la definición de los 
beneficios salariales y no salariales del conjunto de trabajadores de servicios sociales 
en los diferentes niveles del mercado de trabajo, de la industria y del lugar de trabajo. 
Mientras el sector de organizaciones sin fines lucrativos en Toronto procura un contexto 
específico para ello, esas fuerzas reguladoras, particularmente el efecto normativo del 
género, son presentes en otros contextos provinciales y nacionales. Esto es así, al menos 
parcialmente, por que el mercado de servicios comunitarios en otros países desarrollados 
se basa en las mismas características de la nueva gestión pública presente en Canadá.
PALABRAS CLAVES: trabajo pagado de cuidador, modelos de fondos, género, regulación, 
beneficios salariales y no salariales
